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This paper further studies the persistence of disagreement in a model similar to Melguizo 
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sion, the finding is that disagreement persists with the highest probability across the 
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El desacuerdo en modelos de formación de opiniones: 
resultados de estática comparativa
Resumen
Este artículo estudia la persistencia del desacuerdo en un modelo similar a Melguizo (2019), 
relajando dos supuestos importantes. Primero, las opiniones iniciales de los individuos 
son variables aleatorias, y segundo, los individuos pueden tener distintos grados de 
homofilia. Con respecto a la primera extensión, se encuentra que el desacuerdo persiste 
con más probabilidad en el atributo que exhibe la mayor media de la distribución de las 
diferencias en actitudes medias iniciales. Respecto a la segunda, la magnitud del desacu-
erdo y la velocidad de convergencia en él incrementan con respecto al modelo original.
Palabras clave: desacuerdo, homofilia, actualización de actitudes basada en medias.
Clasificación jel: D83, D85, Z13.
O desacordo em modelos de formação de opiniões:  
resultados de estática comparativa 
Resumo
Este artigo estuda a persistência do desacordo em um modelo similar a Melguizo (2019), 
flexibilizando dois supostos importantes. Primeiro, as opiniões iniciais dos indivíduos são 
variáveis aleatórias, e segundo, os indivíduos podem ter distintos graus de homofília. Em 
relação à primeira extensão, se encontra que o desacordo persiste com mais probabilidade 
no atributo que exibe a maior média da distribuição das diferenças em atitudes médias 
iniciais. Com relação à segunda, a magnitude do desacordo e a velocidade de convergência 
nele incrementam respeito ao modelo original.
Palavras-chave: desacordo, homofilia, atualização de atitudes baseada em médias. 
Classificação jel: D83, D85, Z13.
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Introduction
Melguizo (2019) proposes a model of attitude formation where individuals 
update their attitudes by averaging those of their friends. This model cap-
tures the persistence of disagreement, that is, the persistence of a situation in 
which individuals hold different attitudes about an issue. In that approach, 
a collection of dichotomous attributes defines the individuals’ types. Also, 
individuals are more prone to interact with others similar to them in those 
attributes; that is, individuals exhibit homophily.1 Interactions co-evolve with 
attitudes, and this feature is central to the persistence of disagreement. The 
main finding is that disagreement persists if, and only if, individuals develop 
sufficiently intense relations over time with others, similar in one specific 
attribute. Thus, society polarizes according to this dimension.
In that framework, individuals update their attitudes as in DeGroot (1974), 
further: (i) individuals’ attitudes are known with certainty, and (ii) homoph-
ily relations were symmetric; that is, all individuals were homophilous 
with the same intensity. This paper explores how previous findings react to 
natural modifications in these two assumptions. The context is one in which 
individual types come from the combination of two dichotomous attributes. 
Some insights for the case of n ≥ 2 attributes are provided. The following is 
a preview of the results.
(i) Random attitudes. It might be that it is better to describe attitudes as random 
variables. In contexts in which the aim is to learn the true state of the 
world, randomness might be interpreted as lack of information (noise) 
regarding the issue at hand, as in Golub and Jackson (2010); as the degree 
of attitudes’ precision, as in DeMarzo, et al. (2003), or as experts having 
probability distributions about the true state of the world, as in DeGroot 
(1974). In situations in which individuals deal with ideological issues, 
randomness might be interpreted as flexibility or lack of stubbornness. 
In line with these observations, this paper goes further in proposing 
that initial attitudes draw from symmetric continuous distributions. 
This is in line with DeMarzo, et al. (2003), which allow for randomness 
only in the first period. The persistence of disagreement is robust to this 
modification. In particular, disagreement may now persist across one of 
the two attributes. It is, however, more likely to persist across the one for 
1 For a survey on homophily as a pervasive phenomenon in real life interactions, 
see McPherson et al. (2001).
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which the mean of the distribution of the initial differences in attitudes 
is the highest.
(ii) Non-symmetric homophily. It might be also natural to think that the (inten-
sity of) relations that individuals establish with others depend(s) on the 
specific nature of the shared attributes. In fact, McPherson, et al. (2001) 
document how gender homophily is lower when people are younger 
than older. Gender homophily is also lower for high educated than for 
low educated people and for Anglos than for African Americans. This 
might imply, in particular, that pairs of individuals no longer devote the 
same amount of attention to each other. As an example, suppose there are 
four types of individuals, that is, an individual can be either young or old 
and either a female or a male. Consider that young people establish less 
intense relations with same-gender others than seniors. This behavior 
could emerge in the model when individuals have different sensitivity to 
differences in attitudes between groups. Specifically, when confronted with 
information about differences in attitudes between males and females, 
seniors exacerbate the differences in attitudes by gender with respect to 
young people. Notice then that the intensity of gender relations depends 
on another attribute defining the individuals involved; that is, on youth. 
The finding is that, when disagreement persists across the attribute for 
which initial differences in attitudes are the highest, its magnitude is 
higher than in the case in which homophilous relations are symmetric. 
The process also converges faster to the eventual attitudes.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. First, it presents the model 
in Melguizo (2019) to clarify the baseline setup. Then, it discusses random 
attitudes and then the non-symmetric homophily. Next, it includes some com-
ments on the co-existence of random attitudes and non-symmetric homophily. 
After that, it presents the conclusions, and finally, it shows the proofs.
1. A Model on Homophily and Disagreement
Before the extensions, let us first introduce the baseline model in Melguizo 
(2019).
Let I = {1, 2, …, n} be a finite set of attributes. The type A of an individual 
is defined by the attributes possessed by this individual, that is, A ⊆ I. Two 
types, A and B, are i-similar whenever attribute i is either present or absent in 
these two types. Otherwise, they are i-dissimilar. Let Ac be the complemen-
tary set of A. Then I(AB) ≡ (A ∩ B) ∪ (Ac ∩ Bc) is the set of shared attributes 
between A and B.
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The (column) vector of attitudes at time t ∈ Z+ is denoted at ∈ [−1, 1]2
n. Let at
A 
be a typical component of at, denoting the attitude of type A. Notice that there 
are 2n−1 types possessing (resp. lacking) any attribute. Thus, the average attitude 
across types possessing (resp. lacking) attribute i is at i[ ] ≡ 2
n−1( )
−1
A:i∈A  ∑ atA 
resp. at −i[ ] ≡ 2
n−1( )
−1
A:i∉A  ∑ atA( ). The difference between average attitudes across 
attribute i is denoted Δt i[ ] ≡ at i[ ]− at −i[ ].
The following example illustrates the notation for the two-attribute case.
Example 1. Let I = {1, 2}. Types are {1, 2} {1}, {2} and {∅}. Observe, as an illustration, 










such that a '
0
= 0.8 0.2− 0.05− 0.95[ ]. Notice that a0 1[ ] = 0.5 , a0 −1[ ] = −0.5, 
and Δ0 1[ ] = 0.5− −0.5( ) = 1. Analogously, a0 2[ ] = 0.375, a0 −2[ ] = −0.375, and 
Δ0 2[ ] = 0.375− −0.375( ) = 0.75.
Attitudes evolve according to an average-based process similar to DeGroot 
(1974). That is, current attitudes are weighted averages of previous ones. Let 
Wt be the 2
n x 2n weighting matrix describing the updating of attitudes from 
t to t + 1. Thus:
at + 1 = Wt at. (1)
The interpretation of every row in Wt is that every type A has one unit 
of attention to devote to others (and to itself). Then every entry of Wt is the 
weight, i.e., the share of attention, that type A assigns to type B at time t. Let 
wt
A ,B denote this weight. Individuals are homophilous, a behavior that can 
be captured as follows; every attribute i has a non-negative value αt
i . The 
weight that type A assigns to type B is the sum of the values of the shared 
attributes between A and B, that is, wt
A ,B ≡ i∈I AB( )αt
i∑ . For normalization pur-
poses let iαt
i = 2n−1( )−1∑ . That is the right normalization because any type A 
is i-similar to exactly 2n–1 types. Then, B∑ wtA ,B ≡ 2n−1 i∑ αti ≡ 1. Let λti ≡ 2n−1αti , 
so that λt
i ∈ 0,1[ ] and i∑ λti ≡ 1. Notice that sharing at least one attribute is 
necessary for any pair of types A and B to hold a relation.
The following example describes the attention structure.
Example 2. In the two-attribute case, the interaction matrix at time t is:
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To clarify this structure, notice that relations are symmetric and focus 
on type {2}. It is 1-similar and 2-similar to types {∅} and {1, 2}, respectively. 
Thus, it pays attention to them, on the basis of attributes 1 and 2, respectively. 
Since type {2} and {1} does not share any attribute, they pay no (direct) at-
tention to each other.
Let λt
i depend on the difference in average attitudes between the individu-
als possessing and lacking attribute i, that is, on Δt[i], and on (possibly) all 
the differences associated with the remaining attributes, that is, on Δt[j] for 
every attribute j ≠ i. Let, w.l.o.g,
Δ0[1] ≥ Δ0[2] ≥ ⋅⋅⋅ Δ0[n] ≥ 0. (2)
Let further λt
i satisfy three properties:
Within differences monotonicity (wdm): for every attribute i, Δt[i] = 0 implies 
that λt
i = 0, and Δt[i] > 0 implies that λt
i > 0.




n ≥ 0. When Δt[i] = 0 for every attribute i at time t, set λt
i = 1n.
Well defined limit: for every attribute i, lim
t→∞
λt
i ∈ 0,1[ ] and i∑ limt→∞ λt
i = 1. A func-
tional form for λt
i that satisfies the above properties is:
λt
i = Δt i[ ]
δ
j∑ Δt j[ ]δ
, (3)
with δ ∈ [0,∞).
The co-evolution of interactions and attitudes is a key feature for the 
persistence of disagreement. The main finding is that disagreement persists 
if and only if individuals develop sufficiently intense relations over time with 
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others, similar in one specific attribute. Thus, society polarizes according to 
this attribute, and two groups of thinking eventually emerge. Within each 
of these two groups, there is consensus, a situation in which everyone holds 
the same attitude. The attribute according to which society polarizes is the 
one for which initial differences in average attitudes are the highest, that is, 
attribute 1. Specifically, the eventual attitude of an individual that possesses 
attribute 1 is a∞
A = a0 − 2−1 1− r( )Δ0 1[ ] where r = Δ0[2] / Δ0[1].2
In what follows, we analyze the robustness of the model to the proposed 
extensions, one in a row.
2. Random Attitudes
This section follows the environment described in the previous section, 
except for the fact that initial attitudes are random variables. In particular, 
for every individual A, a! 0
A
 follows a continuous symmetric distribution with 
mean a0
A and variance σA
2 . Let initial attitudes be independent of each other 
but not necessarily identically distributed. The vector of random attitudes 
at t is denoted by a! t.
The analysis is for the case of two attributes, denoted by 1 and 2. We 
provide insights for the case in which an arbitrary finite set of n attributes 
is considered. Individuals update attitudes over time, using averages of 
previous period attitudes. The updating process is, thus, summarized in an 
analogous way to (1). The only difference is that now, the attitudes, as well 
as the weights in the updating matrix, are random variables. That is:
a! t = W! t a! t−1 , (4)
where


























































2 See the main theorem in Melguizo (2019).
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∈ 0,1[ ] is the weight, i.e., the intensity of attention, that an in-
dividual assigns to others that share attribute i = 1, 2 with her at time t. In 
other words, λ! t
i
 accounts for the intensity of homophilous relations. Recall 
that conditional on paying attention, the intensity of this attention evolves 
over time, i.e., λ! t
1
 and λ! t
2
 are time-dependent. In particular, the average initial 
differences across attributes 1 and 2 determine the evolution of attention.
We, thus, describe these average init ial differences. Let 







2{ }( )( )  and Δ! 0 2[ ] = 2−1 a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } + a! 02{ } − a! 01{ }( )( ) be 
the distributions of the average initial differences associated to attributes 1 
and 2, respectively. They have means Δ0 1[ ] = 2
−1 a0
1,2{ } − a0
Ø{ } + a0
1{ } − a0
2{ }( )( ) and 
Δ0 2[ ] = 2
−1 a0
1,2{ } − a0
Ø{ } + a0
2{ } − a0
1{ }( )( ), respectively, and the variance, A∑ σA2 / 4 . 
Let, w.l.o.g, Δ0[1] ≥ Δ0[2] ≥ 0, an assumption which is the analogous counterpart 
of condition (2), in the deterministic case. The link between homophily and 




Δ! t 1[ ]
Δ! t 1[ ] + Δ! t 2[ ]
 and λ! t
2
=
Δ! t 2[ ]
Δ! t 1[ ] + Δ! t 2[ ]
.3
analogously to (3), with δ = 1.
Regarding the persistence of disagreement, the main finding is as follows:
Proposition 1. In general, disagreement persists across either attribute 1 or 2 with 
positive probability. Disagreement across attribute 1 is at least as likely as disagree-
ment across attribute 2. Specifically:
1. Both events are equally likely if, and only if the differences in initial attitudes 
across both attributes have the same mean (that is, if, and only if, Δ0[1] = Δ0[2]).
2. Disagreement across attribute 1 is the most likely event if, and only if, the mean 
of its difference in initial attitudes is the highest (that is, if, and only if, Δ0[1] > 
Δ0[2]).
3. The difference between the probability of disagreement persisting across attributes 
1 and 2 is non-negative. Its expression is:
3 Notice that the realization of Δ! t 1[ ] and Δ! t 2[ ] can be positive or negative. The 
only aspect that matters is the magnitude of dierences, that is why the absolute value is 
considered.
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≥ 0( )−1( ) P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( )−P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } < 0( )( ). (5)
As in the deterministic case, differences in initial attitudes play a crucial 
role in disagreement. In contrast to the deterministic case, in which disagree-
ment takes place only on attribute 1, in general, now disagreement persists 
across either attribute. Disagreement will persist across attribute 1 with prob-
ability equal to one when the minimum among all possible realizations of 
Δ! 0 1[ ] is higher than the maximum among all possible realizations of Δ! 0 2[ ] . 
As the (symmetric) distributions of a! 0
1,2{ }
− a! 0
Ø{ } and a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } have non-negative 
means, expression (5) is non-negative.4
It is worth noticing that since the focus is on initial randomness, once 
attitudes realize, eventual attitudes are as in the main Theorem in Melguizo 
(2019) main Theorem. Let a!∞
A
 be the eventual attitude of a type A. Also, let 
i ∈ A (respectively i ∉ A) express the fact that type A possesses (respectively 
lacks) attribute i. The observation is as follows:
Observation. Let disagreement persist on attribute i = {1, 2}. Then,
a!∞
A
= a0 + 2
−1 1−
Δ! 0 j[ ]













= a0 + 2
−1 1−
Δ! 0 j[ ]









Δ! 0 i[ ] if i ∉ A
Thus, disagreement manifests as two groups, holding different limit 
attitudes.5 Examples 3 to 5 illustrate these findings and related aspects:
4 See the proof of Proposition 1.
5 For disagreement on attribute 1, the difference in average limit attitudes is 
Δ!∞ 1[ ] = 2n−1( )−1 A:1∈A∑ a!∞A − A:1∉A∑ a!∞A( ) = 2n−1( )−1 2n−1 a!∞A : 1∈A− a!∞A : 1∉A( ) = Δ! 0 1[ ] − Δ! 0 2[ ]  (re-
spectively Δ! 0 2[ ] − Δ! 0 1[ ] ) when Δ! 0 1[ ] ≥ 0 (respectively Δ! 0 1[ ] < 0). Since disagreement across 
attribute 1 persists when Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ] , Δ!∞ 1[ ] has either positive or negative support. The 
distribution of the difference in average limit attitudes for attribute 2 degenerates at zero. 
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Example 3. First, let a! 0
1,2{ }
∼U 0,1[ ], a! 01{ } ∼U −1,1[ ], a! 02{ } ∼U −1,1[ ] and a! 0Ø{ } ∼U −1,1[ ] . 
Thus, Δ! 0 1[ ] and Δ! 0 2[ ] have means Δ! 0 1[ ] = Δ! 0 2[ ] =0.25. From Proposition 1, 
disagreement across either attribute is equally likely. Recall that the probability 
that disagreement persists across attribute 1 minus the probability that it does 
across attribute 2 depends on a! 0
1,2{ }
− a! 0
Ø{ } and a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ }. As a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } follows a 
(symmetric) triangular distribution with zero mean, this difference is zero.
Second, let a! 0
1,2{ }
∼U 0,1[ ], a! 01{ } ∼U 0,1[ ], a! 02{ } ∼U −1,1[ ] and a! 0Ø{ } ∼U −1,1[ ]. 
Thus, Δ! 0 1[ ] and Δ! 0 2[ ] have means Δ0[1] = 0.5 and Δ0[2] = 0, respectively. 
From Proposition 1, disagreement across attribute 1 is the most likely event. 




 and a! 0
1{ } − a! 0





. It follows a triangular distribution with density:
f y( ) =
1+ y
2
if −1 < y < 0
0.5 if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
1− y
2










Thus, P y ≥ 0( ) = 1− 2−1
y=−1
y=0
∫ 1+ y( ) = 0.75. Also, let z ≡ a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } ≥ 0. Notice that 
z follows the same distribution as y; thus, P (z ≥ 0) = 0.75. In this case, expres-
sion (5) equals 0.25. Disagreement persists across attribute 1 (respectively 2) 
with probability 0.625 (respectively 0.375).
Example 4. Let initial attitudes be normally distributed with means Δ0[1] ≥ Δ0[2] 
> 0 and unitary variances. Figure 1 depicts the probability that disagreement 
persists across attribute 1, as a function of the means of the distribution of 
the initial differences in attitudes. In particular, Δ0[2] is kept constant, while 
Δ0[1] increases. The x-axis represents the ratio x ≡ Δ0[1] / Δ0[2]. The y-axis 
represents the probability of disagreement. The graph suggests a positive 
relation between the mean of the initial differences in attitudes associated 
That is so since out of the 2n−1 types possessing attribute 1, there are 2n−2 types possessing 
attribute 2 and 2n−2 types lacking attribute 2. The same happens within the 2n−1 types lack-
ing attribute 1, hence, Δ!∞ 2[ ] = 2n−1( )−1 A:2∈A a!∞A − A:2∉A a!∞A∑∑( ) = 2−1 2n−2( )−1 2n−2 a!∞A : 1∈A, 2 ∈A+ a!∞A : 1∉A, 2 ∈A( )− a!∞A : 1∈A, 2 ∉A+ a!∞A : 1∉A, 2 ∉A) = 2−12 a! 0 − a! 0( ) = 0
Δ!∞ 2[ ] = 2n−1( )−1 A:2∈A a!∞A − A:2∉A a!∞A∑∑( ) = 2−1 2n−2( )−1 2n−2 a!∞A : 1∈A, 2 ∈A+ a!∞A : 1∉A, 2 ∈A( )− a!∞A : 1∈A, 2 ∉A+ a!∞A : 1∉A, 2 ∉A) = 2−12 a! 0 − a! 0( ) = 0. The analysis is parallel 
when disagreement is on attribute 2.
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with attribute 1, relative to the mean for attribute 2, and the probability of 





















Figure 1. Probability that Disagreement Persists across Attribute 1
Example 5. The variances of the distributions of initial attitudes may af-
fect the probability of disagreement. Consider that initial attitudes are 
normally distributed with the same means as in the previous example, 
for the cases in which Δ0[1] > Δ0[2] ≥ 0. In contrast, let the variances of 
these random variables, instead of being all equal to one, be such that 
and a! 0
1{ }' − a! 0
2{ }' and/or a! 0
1,2{ }'
− a! 0
Ø{ }' are mean preserving spreads of a! 0









≥ 0( ) < P a! 01{ }' − a! 02{ }' ≥ 0( ) 




≥ 0( ) < P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } ≥ 0( ).6 Notice that expression (5) has now 
lower value than before, meaning that disagreements across either attribute 
are closer to being equally likely.
The case of an arbitrary set of n > 2 attributes is a natural extension of the 
case of two attributes. In this case, the probability of disagreement across a 
6 Notice that Δ0[1] = Δ0[2] ≥ 0 holds when a0
1{ } − a0
2 = 0. In this case, regardless of the vari-
ances, disagreement across either attribute is equally likely. See the proof of Proposition 1.
Disagreement in a Naïve Model of Attitude Formation: Comparative Statics Results
Revista de Economía del Rosario. Vol. 23. No. 2. Julio-Diciembre 2020. 15-24
12
particular attribute i is the probability that this attribute generates the highest 
average initial differences, that is, P(|Δ0[i]| > |Δ0[k]|, ∀k ≠ i). For any attribute i, 
the computation of this probability requires taking into account all the pos-
sible orders in which the differences of the n – 1 remaining attributes may 
appear, when that particular attribute exhibits the highest initial difference. 
Thus, the computation of this probability entails some technical difficulties.
However, the intuition is that the workings of the model with an arbitrary 
set of attributes are parallel to the ones of the two-attribute case. More spe-
cifically, the conjectures are that: (i) disagreement is going to persist across 
any attribute with positive probability and (ii) the higher the mean of the 
distribution of initial differences in attitudes across a particular attribute, 
the higher the probability that disagreement persists across it. The following 
remark points toward this direction. Recall that we assume that the mean of 
the distributions of initial differences in attitudes is the analogous counterpart 
of expression (2), that is, Δ0[1] ≥ Δ0[2] ≥ ⋅⋅⋅ ≥ Δ0[n] ≥ 0.
Remark 1. For any pair of attributes i, i + 1∈!, the probability |Δ̃ 0[1]| > |Δ̃ 0[i + 1]| 
is at least one half.
This remark establishes that, for any pair of consecutive attributes, the 
probability of observing realizations of attitudes such that their initial differ-
ences preserve the order prescribed by their means is the most likely event. 
In particular, this probability is higher than one half when the means are 
strictly different and exactly one half when they are equal. The proof is the 
analogous counterpart of the one of Proposition 1. That result also suggests 
that the event in which we observe the same ranking of initial differences 
in attitudes than the one dictated by the means of the distributions of initial 
differences could be the most likely. Thus, disagreement across attribute 1 
will be the most likely event.
3. Non-Symmetric Homophily
Again, consider the environment described in section 1. Let the four individu-
als be the result of the combination of attribute 1, which refers to the gender 
(possessing it means being female, whereas lacking it means being male), and 
attribute 2, which refers to youth (possessing it means being young, whereas 
lacking it means being old). Let old types (those lacking attribute 2) be more 
homophilous with respect to gender than young types (those possessing 
attribute 2). In this context, that means that old types are more sensitive to 
differences in attitudes associated with gender than young types. Given the 
structure of attention, as old types are more homophilous with respect to 
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gender than young types, they are also less homophilous regarding youth 
than young types. Specifically, at each t, let β1t and β
2
t depend on Δt[1] and Δt[2] 
and be such that seniors exacerbate homophily towards gender. Specifically, 
let β1t , β
2
t ∈ [0, 1] be such that β1t + β2t = 1 and β2t > λ1t, β1t < λ2t. In particular, β1t = 1 
when λ1t = 1.
7 The interaction matrix is:













































Interactions, thus, become non-symmetric. Recall, that the law of motion 
of attitudes is given by (1). The consequences that this type of non-symmetric 
interactions has on the magnitude of disagreement, measured as the size of 
eventual average differences in attitudes across attribute 1, on segregation, 
and on the speed of convergence are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2. For any vector of initial attitudes, the vector of limit attitudes is well 
defined and exhibits disagreement across attribute 1. Specifically, types hold the same 
limit attitude if and only if they are similar in attribute 1. Furthermore:
1. The magnitude of disagreement is larger than in the symmetric case where, at 







2. Convergence is faster than in the symmetric case.
3. At every t, the groups of individuals similar in attribute 1(respectively attribute 
2) are more (respectively less) segregated than in the symmetric case.
As the relations on the basis of attribute 1 get more intense at every point 
in time, the process leads to a larger disagreement, measured as the magnitude 
of eventual average differences in attitudes across attribute 1, and converges 
faster to it. At each point in time, individuals that share attribute 1 are more 
segregated than in the symmetric case, according to the Spectral Segregation 
Index by Echenique and Fryer (2007). Also, this process will give rise to 
7 One can consider that β1 and β2 are transformations of λ1 and λ2, respectively. See 
example 6
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disagreement across attribute 1 even in the case in which the differences 
in average initial attitudes are equal, that is, even when Δ0[1] = Δ0[2]. That 
is so because attribute 1 deserves even more attention now that in the case 
in which relations are symmetric. An extreme version is such that at every 
time t, and regardless of the magnitude of differences in attitudes, βt
1 = 1 and 
thus, βt
2 = 0. Then, attribute 2 (youth) does not play any role for old types, 
namely, for types {1} and {∅}. They only pay attention to others based on the 
gender dimension - attribute 1-, that is, to types {1, 2} and {2}, respectively. 
The following example illustrates the findings:
Example 6. Let a0
'  = [0.8 0.2 -0.05 -0.95] be the vector of initial attitudes. In this 
case, Δ0[1] = 1 and Δ0[2] = 0.75, and thus, as stated in Proposition 1 in Melguizo 
(2019), disagreement persists and manifests in two groups of thinking, defined 
according to the possession or lack of attribute 1. That is, the vector of limit 
attitudes is a∞
'  = [0.126 0.126 – 0.126 – 0.126]. Let α > 1 and set βt
2 = λt
2( )α < λt2, 
thus βt
1 = 1− λt
2( )α > 1− λt2 = λt1. In particular, for α = 2 we have that a∞'  = [0.341 
0.341 – 0.226 – 0.226]. The magnitude of disagreement, measured as the 
difference in average eventual attitudes between the groups of individuals 
possessing and lacking attribute 1, is 0.25 in the symmetric case and 0.567 
in the case described here. The later would also increase with the value of α.
For the case in which attribute 1 is, initially, at least as salient as attribute 
2 —that is, Δ0[1] ≥ Δ0[2]— but individuals pay more attention than before to 
others similar to them in attribute 2, that is, βt
2 > λt
2 —and thus, βt
1 > λt
1—, it 
might be that differences in attitudes associated with attribute 2 become the 
highest at some point in time. In this case disagreement would persist across 
that attribute. Consider two extreme cases: (i) let Δ0[1] = Δ0[2] > 0 but βt
1 > λt
1. 
Then it directly follows that Δ1[1] < Δ1[2]. Thus, λ1
1 < 2−1 < λ1
2 and β1
1 < 2−1 < β1
2. 
The analysis from t = 1 on is the same than the one of Proposition 2, now 
applied to differences across attribute 2. Thus, disagreement persists across 
attribute 2. (ii) let Δ0[1] > Δ0[2], but βt
1 = 0 and thus βt
2 = 1, at every t. In this 
case, disagreement also persists across attribute 2.8 
8 From the proof of Proposition 2, we have that Δt 1[ ] = λt−11 /2( )Δt−1 1[ ]  and 
Δt 2[ ] = λt−1
2 +1( )/2( )Δt−1 2[ ]. Thus, λ11 = Δ1 1[ ]Δ1 1[ ]+ Δ1 2[ ]
=
λt−1
1 /2( )Δ0 1[ ]
λt−1
1 /2( )Δ0 1[ ]+ 1− λt−11 /2( )Δ0 2[ ]
. This 
is equivalent to λ1
1 = 1+ r0
2 2 − λ0
1( )/λ01( )−1 where r02 = Δ0 2[ ]/Δ0 1[ ]. Notice that λ01 = 1+ r02( )−1. 
Since λ1
1 < λ0
1 it follows that λ2
1 < λ1
1. In general, at every t time, λt+1
1 < λt
1, so that λt
1 tends to 
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Another possibility is to study the case in which some types exhibit 
constant homophily, that is, the attention they pay to similar others does 
not co-evolve with attitudes. This is the case if, for instance, βt
1 =α in (0,1), at 
every time t. In this case, when the limiting matrix of interactions, namely, 
limt→∞Wt, exists with limt→∞ λt
1 ∈ 0,1( ), it would be such that no pair of rows are 
orthogonal. Following Leizarowitz (1992), consensus will eventually emerge 
in this case. In other words, when limt→∞ λt
1 ∈ 0,1( ), eventual interactions are 
described by a strongly connected graph. That allows attitudes to flow from 
every individual to any other.
Notice that in the case of n > 2 attributes, the results would go through 
as long as individuals exacerbate the attention they pay to the attribute with 
the highest initial mean, that is, to attribute 1, which is gender, in this case. 
The conjecture is that this result will also hold even if individuals exacer-
bate attention at different extents. As for the case of two attributes, when 
individuals exacerbate the attention they pay to attributes different from 
attribute 1, it may be that one of these attributes becomes the one with the 
highest differences in attitudes at some point in time. Then, the conjecture 
is that disagreement will persist across it.
4. Comments on the Co-Existence of Random 
Attitudes and Non-Symmetric Homophily
The previous sections explored the implications of extending the model in 
two different directions, one at a time. We showed that for the case of two 
attributes, disagreement across attribute 1 was the most likely event. In the 
case of non-symmetric homophily, as long as individuals exacerbate their 
homophilous behavior towards 1-similar others, disagreement across at-
tribute 1 still takes place.
An interesting question is what the implications are of facing both ex-
tensions simultaneously in action. In what follows, there are comparisons 
with the cases in which attitudes are random (and homophily symmetric), 
and the opposite case in which attitudes are non-random but homophily is 
non-symmetric.
0 and λt
2 tends to 1. Consequently, for sufficiently large t, it has to be that λt
2 > λt
1 and thus 
Δt[2] > Δt[1]. From this point on, apply the proof of Proposition 2 to attribute 2.
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Remark 2. Consider the case of two attributes in which attitudes are random 
and homophily is non-symmetric. Then, the probability that disagreement persists 
across attribute 1 is, at least, as high as in the case in which attitudes are random 
but homophily is symmetric.
This remark tells that adding instances of non-symmetric homophily that 
exacerbate the attention paid to attribute 1, may increase the probability of 
disagreement on attribute 1, with respect to the case in which attitudes are 
random but homophily symmetric. The basic intuition is that with random 
attitudes, there may be instances in which initial differences are the high-
est on attribute 2. As the attention towards attribute 1 exacerbates, when 
this attention is sufficiently important, the process may end up showing 
disagreement on it.
Consider now the opposite case in which attitudes are non-random and 
homophily non-symmetric. In this case, there was a unique outcome, which 
was disagreement on attribute 1 because initial differences were the highest 
across it. Adding randomness over non-symmetric homophily implies that 
the initial differences may not be always the highest on attribute 1. That 
possibly reduces the probability that disagreement takes place on it. In other 
words, the probability that disagreement persists across attribute 2 may be 
positive. The reason is that with non-symmetric homophily, the evolution 
of average differences in attitudes basically relies on a linear combination 
between the original attention paid to attribute 1 in the symmetric case, λt
i , 
and the exacerbated attention paid to attribute 1, βt
i. Intuitively, when differ-
ences across attribute 2 are the highest, it turns out that λt
i  is small; thus, βt
i 
should be high enough to compensate the former. If that is not the case, then 
disagreement may take place on attribute 2. That very much depends on the 
assumptions made on the relation between the aforementioned parameters.
Conclusions
This note explores natural modifications of the setting proposed by Melguizo 
(2019). Regarding random initial attitudes, the finding is that disagreement 
persists with the highest probability across the attribute that exhibits the 
highest mean of the distribution of initial differences in attitudes. Taking 
into account non-symmetric homophily, the magnitude of disagreement, and 
the speed of convergence to it, increases with respect to the case in which 
individuals’ interactions are symmetric.
One interesting aspect to consider is the implications of having individu-
als seeking for information that supports their views, a phenomenon which 
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is known as confirmation bias.9 One model that may be interpreted in these 
terms is analyzed in Hegselmann and Krause (2002). In it, individuals pay 
attention to others whose attitudes are not so far from their own. To do 
so, they define what they call levels of confidence to others’ opinions. The 
authors find instances of consensus (for high confidence levels) as well as of 
fragmentation (for low confidence levels), that is, the persistence of multiple 
groups of thinking.
In the context of the current setting, in which initial differences in at-
titudes determine disagreement, confirmation biases could be modeled as 
individuals not only considering initial differences but also how close i-similar 
individuals’ attitudes are from their own. One way to incorporate this aspect 
is to consider that the attention, λt
1, each individual pays to 1-similar others at 
time t would be increasing in the initial differences as before and decreasing 
in the variance of the distribution of attitudes of the group of 1-similar types. 
Intuitively, small variances suggest that attitudes are sufficiently closed to the 
mean, and hence sufficiently closed among themselves. Thus, the confirma-
tion bias effect may be captured in this setting.
To illustrate the idea, consider that a0
'  = [0.75 0.5 0.25 0]. Notice that 
a0 1[ ] = 0.625, a0 −1[ ] = 0.125, and Δ0[1] = 0.625 – 0.125 = 0.5. Thus, in the original 
setting disagreement takes place across attribute 1. Consider the distribution of 
attitudes of 1-similar types. The variance of the distribution of these attitudes 
for individuals who have attribute 1 is 2-1 [(0.75 – 0.625)2 + (0.5 – 0.625)2] = 
0.0078. The variance of the distribution of these attitudes for individuals that 
lack attribute 1 is the same, that is, 2-1 [(0.25 – 0.125)2 + (0 – 0.125)2] = 0.0078. 
Doing analogous computation, one sees that the variances of the distribution 
of attitudes for 2-similar individuals are the same and equal to 0.625. Thus, 
in this case, if attention is sensitive also to variances, that would exacerbate 
the attention individuals pay to 1-similar others. Intuitively the lower the 
variance, the most informative is the average attitude about the cohesion 
within a society of individuals that share an attribute. Of course, that is only 
an example. However, it suggests that the particular distribution of initial 
attitudes, and not only the average differences, would play a role in reinforc-
ing disagreement across attribute 1, reverting this outcome to disagreement 
on attribute 2, or even reaching consensus.
Finally, it may also be that individuals possessing and lacking one specific 
attribute, say 1, observe different variances within the attitudes of their group. 
9 See Nickerson (1998), Zollo, et al. (2015), and Quattrociocchi, et al. (2016).
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Thus, they will be paying different attention to 1-similar others. That is a 
different setting that may be linked to the case of non-symmetric homophily.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Compute the probability that disagreement per-
sists across attributes 1 and 2 when, first, Δ0[1] > Δ0[2] ≥ 0 or, equivalently, 
a0
1,2{ } − a0
Ø{ } + a0
1{ } − a0
2{ } > a0
1,2{ } − a0
Ø{ } + a0
2{ } − a0
1{ }. Notice that Δ0 1[ ]− Δ0 2[ ] = a01{ } − a02{ }. 
Thus, a0
1{ } − a0
2{ } > 0  has to hold. Since Δ0[2] ≥ 0 and a0
2{ } − a0
1{ } < 0, then 
a0
1,2{ } − a0
Ø{ } ≥ a0
1{ } − a0
2{ } > 0 has to hold as well.
Now, consensus emerges whenever Δ! 0 1[ ]  = Δ! 0 2[ ] , and disagreement per-
sists across attribute 1 (respectively attribute 2) whenever Δ! 0 1[ ]  > Δ! 0 2[ ]  (resp. 
Δ! 0 1[ ]  < Δ! 0 2[ ] . To see this, notice that once initial attitudes are realized, the 
process exactly mimics the one in Melguizo (2019). In what follows, we describe 
the probability that either consensus emerges or disagreement persists. The 
















= Δ! 0 2[ ]  is 
zero. That is so because this expression holds when exactly a! 0
1{ } − a! 0




Ø{ } = 0. Since these differences follow continuous distributions, the 
probability that this happens is zero.10 Disagreement persists across attribute 
















= Δ! 0 2[ ] . This 
expression is satisfied when a! 0
1,2{ }
− a! 0
Ø{ } ≥ 0 and a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } ≥ 0, or a! 0
1,2{ }
− a! 0
Ø{ } < 0, 
and a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ }
 < 0 hold. Thus, P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( ) = P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } ≥ 0∩ a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( )+P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } < 0∩ a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } < 0( )
P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( ) = P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } ≥ 0∩ a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( )+P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } < 0∩ a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } < 0( ). Since a! 0A are independent to each other, 





≥ 0( )P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( )+P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } < 0( )P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } < 0( ) (6)
On the contrary, disagreement persists across attribute 2 whenever 
















= Δ! 0 2[ ] . This expression 
10 As a! 0
2{ } is continuous, so is −a! 0
2{ }. The sum a! 0
1{ } + −a! 0
2{ }( ) is, accordingly, continuous. 
See Sheldon et al. (2002).
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is satisfied when a! 0
1,2{ }
− a! 0
Ø{ } < 0 and, or a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } ≥ 0, or a! 0
1,2{ }
− a! 0
Ø{ } ≥ 0 and 
a! 0
1{ } − a! 0





≥ 0( )P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } < 0( )+P a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } < 0( )P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( ) (7)





≥ 0( )−1( ) P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( )−P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } < 0( )( ) (8)
Since a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } has positive mean (recall that a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } > 0) and the dif-
ference of independent symmetric random variables is symmetric, then 
P a! 0
1{ } − a! 0
2{ } ≥ 0( ) > 0.5.11 The same argument holds for a! 01,2{ } − a! 0Ø{ } and, con-




≥ 0( ) > 0.5. This implies that (8) is positive. Since 
P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( ) = 1−P Δ! 0 1[ ] < Δ! 0 2[ ]( ), disagreement across attribute 1 is 




≥ 0( ) = P a! 01{ } − a! 02{ } ≥ 0( ) = 1 
the probability that disagreement takes place across attribute 1 is exactly one. 
Let now Δ0[1] = Δ0[2] ≥ 0 or, equivalently, Δ0 1[ ]− Δ0 2[ ] = a01{ } − a02{ } = 0. Since 
the mean of differences is non-negative, a0
1,2{ } − a0
Ø{ } ≥ 0 holds. That implies, 
by symmetry, that P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( )−P Δ! 0 1[ ] < Δ! 0 2[ ]( ) = 0. In this case, 
disagreement across either attribute is equally likely.
Proof of Remark 1. Consider n attributes with initial means Δ0[1] ≥ Δ0[2] ≥ ⋅⋅⋅ 
≥ Δ0[n] ≥ 0. For any pair of attributes i, i + 1, there are 2
n – 1 individuals that 
have i and 2n – 1 that lack it. The same holds for i + 1.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, the ranking of initial means implies that 
for any pair i, i+1 : Δ0 i[ ]−Δ0 i+1[ ] = A|i∈A ,i+1∉A a0
A∑ − A|i+1∈A ,k∉A a0A∑ > 0. Since, dif-
ferences are positive: A|i ,i+1∈A a0
A∑ − A|i ,i+1∉A a0A∑ > 0 must also hold. Analogously 
to expression (6) in the proof of Proposition 1:
11 See Stroock (2010).
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P Δ! 0 i[ ] > Δ! 0 i + 1[ ]( )
= P A i ,i+1∈A a! 0
A∑ − A k ,k+1∉A a! 0A∑ ≥ 0∩ A i∈A ,i+1∉A a! 0A∑ − A i+1∈A ,k∉A a! 0A∑ ≥ 0( )
+P A i ,i+1∈A a! 0
A∑ − A i ,i+1∉A a! 0A∑ < 0∩ A i∈A ,i+1∉A a! 0A∑ − A i+1∈A ,i∉A a! 0A∑ < 0( ).
We can also compute P Δ! 0 i[ ] < Δ! 0 i + 1[ ]( ) as in (7). Notice that 
P Δ! 0 i[ ] > Δ! 0 i + 1[ ]( )− P Δ! 0 i[ ] < Δ! 0 i + 1[ ]( ) yields an expression analogous 
to (8). Specifically, this expression is, in short, (2P – 1) (2P' – 1). Here P stands 
for the probability that the sum of attitudes of individuals that have both i 
and i + 1, minus the sum of attitudes of individuals that lack both i and i + 
1 is non-negative. Analogously, P' stands for the probability that the sum of 
attitudes of individuals that have i and lack i + 1, minus the sum of attitudes 
of individuals with i + 1 and without i is non-negative.
Analogously to the proof of Proposition 1, the distribution of the sum of 
attitudes of individuals that have i and lack i + 1 minus the sum of attitudes 
of individuals that with i + 1 but without i have positive or zero means, 
depending on whether Δ0[i] – Δ0[i + 1] > 0 or Δ0[i] – Δ0[i + 1] = 0, respectively. 
The same holds for the distribution of the sum of attitudes of individuals 
that have both i and i + 1 minus the sum of attitudes of individuals that lack 
both i and i + 1.
That, together with symmetry implies that both, P and P', are higher than 
one half whenever Δ0[i] – Δ0[i + 1] > 0 and that P' is one half —and thus (2P – 1) 
(2P' – 1) is zero— whenever Δ0[i] – Δ0[i + 1] = 0. Thus, P Δ! 0 i[ ] − Δ! 0 i+1[ ]( ) is 
higher than one half whenever Δ0[i] – Δ0[i + 1] > 0, and one half otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, there is a statement regarding the evolution 
of homophily values. Let Δ0[1] > Δ0[2]. It then follows that λ0






1( )2−1 ∈ 0,1( ]. Notice that as Δt 1[ ] = 2−1 at 1,2{ } + at 1{ }( )− at 2{ } + atØ{ }( )( ), 
using Wt in the main body, we can rewrite Δt 1[ ] = λt−1
* Δt−1 1[ ]. Similarly, 
Δt 2[ ] = 1−λt−1
*( )Δt−1 2[ ]. As these expressions hold for every t, Δt 1[ ] = λ s−1* Δt 1[ ]s=0
t−1
∏  




∏ Δ0 2[ ] hold. So that disagree-ment persists whenever 
limt→∞ Δt 1[ ] ≠ 0 or limt→∞ Δt 2[ ] ≠ 0.
For the ease of exposition, let λ! t
i
 for i = {1,2} be the homophily value 
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symmetric Wt is going to be different from λt
i  in the non- symmetric Wt in 
the main body, as is made clear below. Since by assumption βt
1 > λt






*Δ0 1[ ]+ 1−λ0
*( )Δ0 2[ ]
> λ! 1
1
. Thus, Δ2 1[ ] = λ1*Δ1 1[ ] is higher than in 
the symmetric case, while Δ2 2[ ] = 1− λ1*( )Δ1 2[ ] is smaller than in the sym-
metric case. As a consequence, λ2
1 > λ! 2
1
. In general at every t, βt
1 > λt









1 = λ! 0
1
.
Consider a sequence of ones. Since at every t, 1> λt
1 ≥ λ! t by step 7 in the 
proof of the main Therem in Melguizo (2019), as limt→∞ λ! t
1
= 1 then limt→∞ λt
1 = 1. 
Also since 1 ≥ βt
1 > λt
1, thus limt→∞βt
1 = 1. By the same step, log λ! t
1( )t=0
∞
∑  was con-
vergent. Since at every t, λt
* = λt
1 +βt





∑  converges and, hence, λt* = δ ∈ 0,1( ]t=0
∞
∏ . Since at every 
t, λt
1 > λ! t
1





∏ . Since limt→∞ 1−λt* = 0 then 1−λt*( ) = 0t=0
∞
∏  
holds. Recall that at+1 =Wtat. Rewrite Wt as:

































































2  and βt
2), enter with positive sign if, 
and only if, type A possesses attribute 1 (respectively attribute 2). 
It then follows that at+1
A = at + 2−1 −1( )1+1i λt1Δt 1[ ]+ λt2Δt 2[ ]( ) if 2 ∈ A and 
at+1
A = at + 2−1 −1( )1+1i βt1Δt 1[ ]+βt2Δt 2[ ]( ) if 2 ∉ A, where 1i is the indicator of type 
A possessing attribute 1. Using the recursive expressions for Δt[1] and Δt[2] 
above, let at+1
A = at + 2






∏ λ s*Δ0 2[ ]s=0
t−1
∏( ) if 2 ∈ A and 
at+1
A = at + 2






∏ λ s*Δ0 2[ ]s=0
t−1










1 = 1 and lim
t→∞
λt






−1δΔ0 1[ ] if 
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−1δΔ0 1[ ] if 1 ∉ A, provided that limt→∞ at exists. Sim-
ple algebra yields at = a0 + 4
−1 λ s
2 −βs
2( )Δs 2[ ] = a0 + 4−1Δ0 2[ ]s=0
t−1





at = a0 + 4
−1 λ s
2 −βs
2( )Δs 2[ ] = a0 + 4−1Δ0 2[ ]s=0
t−1




∏ . Thus, to prove the existence of the aforementioned lim-
it, it is left to prove that λ s
2 −βs
2( )λ s2 −βs2s=0
∞
∑  converges. That is done by 





∑  converges. Ergo, given that at every time 
s, λ s
2 −βs
2 > λ s
2 −βs
2( ) 1−λm*( )m=0
s−1








∏  converges. Notice that λ s2 −βs2( )s=0
∞
∑  converges if, 




∏  converges, i.e., this limit product is a number 
different from zero, see Apostol (1977) chapter 8, Theorem 8.55. Rewrite this 





∑ . From step 7 in the proof of the main theorem 





∏ . Recall that since βs2 < λ s2, then ο ≤ λ s1 +βs2 < 1. 
Also, since at each s λ s
1 ≥ λ! s
1
 then λ s
1 +βs
2 ≥ λ! s
1





∏ ∈ 0,1( ] . 
Thereupon, if λ s
2 −βs
2( )∈ 0,1( ]
s=0
∞









A = a0 4
1αΔ0 2[ ]+ 2
−1δΔ0 1[ ] if 1 ∈ A and limt→∞ at+1
A = a0 4
1αΔ0 2[ ]− 2
−1δΔ0 1[ ] if 
1 ∉ A. As stated above, δ > μ. Thus, disagreement persists across attribute 
1 and the magnitude of disagreement in the non-symmetric case, that is, 
lim
t→∞
Δt 1[ ] = δΔ0 1[ ] is higher than the magnitude of disagreement in the sym-
metric case: lim
t→∞
Δt 1[ ] = µΔ0 1[ ]. Finally, since βt1 > λt1 > λ! t
1
 and λt
1 are, at every 
time t, closer to 1 than λ! t
1
, the convergence is also faster.
Let now Δ0[1] = Δ0[2]. Then λ! t
1
= 2−1 at every time t by the proof of the main 
theorem in Melguizo (2019). By the same arguments as above, λ1




1 > λ! t
1
 at every time t > 1. Thus, Δt[1] is higher than the one in the symmetric 
case at every time t > 1. As a result, consider the process as starting at time 
t = 1 with λt
1 > λ! t
1
 and the same arguments as above follow. Thus, disagreement 
persists across attribute 1 and is higher than in the symmetric case, being 
the convergence faster.
The computation of the spectral segregation index directly follows the 
proof of Proposition 2 in Melguizo (2019). Its value is 2−1 1+βt
1( ) for the groups 
of individuals similar in attribute 1. Since βt
1 > λ! t
1
 at every time, the segrega-
tion of this group is higher than in the symmetric case. The opposite holds 
for individuals similar in attribute 2.
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Proof of Remark 2. Consider that attitudes are random and homophily is 
non-symmetric. Let the means of the initial distributions of attitudes be:
1. Δ0[1] > Δ0[2]. In this case, from Proposition 1, it holds that P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( ) 
is higher than one half. From Proposition 2, in all these events, disagree-
ment takes place across attribute 1.
2. Δ0[1] > Δ0[2]. From Proposition 1, it holds that P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( ) is one half. 
From Proposition 2, in all these events, disagreement also takes place 
across attribute 1.
With respect to the case in which only random attitudes are in action, 
in the case in which, in addition, non-symmetric homophily plays a role, 
individuals exacerbate the attention they pay to attribute 1. That happens 
also in the events in which P Δ! 0 1[ ] > Δ! 0 2[ ]( ). Thus, it may be that the differ-
ences across attribute 1 become at least as high as the differences in attribute 
2, at some point in time t!. If such a exists, then the analysis in the proof of 
Proposition 2 applies, from that point in time t!  on, to attribute 1. Thus, dis-
agreement persists across that attribute. The conclusion is, therefore, that the 
probability that disagreement persists across attribute 1 is at least as high 
in the case with random variables and non-symmetric homophily as in the 
case in which only random variables are in action.
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